The aim of this essay is to contribute to the understanding of the neglected topic of sentencing hearings, by describing the historical circumstances that led to the emergence of distinct sentencing hearings within the criminal trial. The novel account offered in this essay suggests that sentencing hearings evolved as a partially unintended result of the massive changes in the adversarial trial that took place during the second part of the 18th century. As a result of these changes, sentencing hearings began to emerge at the end of the 18th century. These findings stand in contradiction to various suggestions made in American case-law and law review articles, which linked the development of sentencing hearings to the rise of the rehabilitation model at the end of the 19th century.
INTRODUCTION
Criminal trials in common-law jurisdictions usually include two separate stages. 1 The first stage focuses on the guilt or innocence of the accused, and ends with a conviction or acquittal. In the more frequent case of a conviction, a second stage is held, often referred to as the sentencing hearing, in which the nature and extent of the punishment are determined. Significant procedural differences currently exist between these two stages. Usually, the decision regarding criminal responsibility lies with the jury, 2 whereas a judge determines the punishment at the end of the sentencing hearing. 3 Moreover, different rules apply to each of the stages and well-established norms, regarding the duties and rights of the parties during the first stage of the trial, are not applied in sentencing hearings. 4 Basic rules of evidence are also enforced during the sentencing hearing, if at all, in an extremely lax manner (Young, 1994) . Thus, even though factfinding is a necessary component of both of the jury's decision, regarding criminal responsibility, and the judge's determination, concerning punishment, and additional similarities can be drawn between the function of the two stages, the criminal trial currently encompasses two separate procedural systems.
How did the criminal trial come to include a sentencing hearing, governed by a completely different procedural regime? It is impossible to find an adequate answer to this question in the literature, as for various reasons, only scant scholarly work refers to the emergence of the sentencing hearing and to the development of its unique structure. 5 This phenomenon is somewhat surprising, in light of the fact that sentencing hearings are a central component, if not the most central component, of the modern adversarial trial. In the vast majority of cases, sentencing hearings are all that is left of the criminal trial, since over 90 per cent of criminal trials in the United States are resolved through guilty pleas (Bibas, 2001 (Bibas, : 1150 . Moreover, it seems likely that many offenders are far more interested in the penal outcome of their trial than in the court's determination of their criminal responsibility.
The lack of research regarding the history of sentencing hearings became particularly evident in the legal literature of the last decade. The reason for this is that since the onset of sentencing guidelines in the late 20th century, the United States Supreme Court has occasionally referred to the history of sentencing hearings, in the course of confronting various issues relating to sentencing procedure. 6 The trigger for the court's interest in this issue were arguments made by defendants, claiming that fact-finding during sentencing violated their right to trial by jury. 7 Faced with a task of constitutional interpretation, the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution in the late 18th century was discussed by the Court, and the nature of sentencing hearings during this period became a factor relevant to the determination of the case. 8 The historical account which was offered in these cases was mostly speculative and included statements that sentencing discretion did not exist prior to the 19th century, and that sentencing hearings only began to emerge in the mid-19th century, together with the distinction between sentencing factors and elements of the offence. 9 The court's decisions were scrutinized in numerous law review articles; however, the main focus of most of the articles was legal. Only a handful of articles that addressed sentencing procedure, both before and after the surge of litigation described above, briefly addressed the historical aspects of the court's decisions. 10 The aim of this essay is to contribute to the understanding of sentencing hearings, by detecting the historical circumstances that led to the emergence of distinct sentencing hearings within the criminal trial. The novel account offered in this essay suggests that sentencing hearings evolved as a partially unintended result of the massive changes in the adversarial trial that took place during the late 18th century, and that they were already in existence at the end of the 18th century. These findings stand in contradiction to arguments which appeared in American case-law and law review articles, which linked the development of sentencing hearings to the rise of the rehabilitation model at the end of the 19th century. 11 My essay unfolds in the following manner. In order to comprehend the characteristics of the modern adversarial trial as it functioned in the 18th century, it is essential to understand the unique role of the jury within the process. I shall therefore begin with a short description of the rise and fall of the medieval criminal trial, which led to the appearance of the jury during the 13th century and at the end of the 16th century, to the development of the adversarial trial. The main focus of the historical exposition will be on the emergence of the modern adversarial trial, in the middle of the 18th century. Once the foundations for a deeper appreciation of the criminal trial during this important period have been laid, I will explain the form of sentencing discretion that existed at the time and present the evidence for the emergence of sentencing hearings at the end of the 18th century, at least in some courts of law. I will follow up with some comments regarding the impact of early 20th-century penal policies on sentencing hearings, and conclude with several observations relating to lessons that might be learned from the history of sentencing hearings.
DECISION MAKING IN THE EARLY ENGLISH TRIAL AND THE FORMATION OF THE JURY
Medieval criminal trials in England were ordeals that determined guilt or innocence by exposing the suspect to cold water, hot water, hot iron or stones, or by forcing him to swallow a morsel. 12 Infrequent methods included battle, 13 or compurgation. 14 The ordinary punishment was death, which in any case was the outcome of most ordeals that indicated guilt. Therefore no analytical difference existed between the determination of guilt and punishment which, in a procedure governed by God, made perfect sense. 15 The notion of 'information' as a tool to assess a defendant's guilt or to determine his/her punishment was not only irrelevant to the ordeal but totally contradictory to the religious concept of the proceedings. The articulation of reasons for the penal decision is also a practice that had no significance in a system governed by God, and therefore the ordeal has very little bearing on modern sentencing procedure (Baker, 1990: 85) .
The different forms of ordeals survived until the end of the 12th century. In 1215, Pope Innocent III decided to abolish trial by ordeal, in accordance with the position taken by the Fourth Lateran Council (Jackson, 1988: 487) . The official reasons given for this decision drew on instances of fraudulent ordeals and on theological doubts regarding various details of the process. However, it is more likely that ordeals no longer aroused public confidence and that they had lost their legitimacy as an acceptable foundation for empirical decisions. 16 Thus, abolition of ordeals can be seen as a precursor of the great revolution that would sweep through Europe a hundred years later, during the Renaissance, when a theocentric perspective on the conduct of human affairs would give way to an anthropocentric approach. 17 In the sphere of criminal trials, human beings were now regarded as the authority on matters of guilt and innocence, and the Roman-canonic system of proof was installed as a source of guidance. 18 The system was initially adopted in England and on the Continent; but it did not survive for long on British soil. Several explanations for this phenomenon have been offered, including the earlier termination of feudalism in England together with the founding of a monarchical regime (Cohen, 1992: 8) and the greater influence of philosophical writings empowering human inquiry in England than on the Continent (Jackson, 1988: 487) .
The English jury developed as ordeals began to lose their popularity, and it is more than mere coincidence that the year in which the most famous text immortalizing the English jury was written, was also the year in which the ordeal was abolished. 19 The text is, of course, section 39 of the Magna Carta, 20 which did not establish a general right to trial by jury, as many assume, but only protected the aristocracy's right, in felony cases, to be tried before the King's Council (Baker, 1977: 23) .
The origins of the jury can be found in a unique practice that developed in the late 11th and early 12th century. According to this practice, during the King's periodic tour, 12-16 people from each district reported to the King's clerks all crimes committed in their district since his last visit. 21 This delegation was eventually given the title of 'presenting jury', and its formal task became initiating criminal proceedings. Once the ordeal was officially abolished, the King retained the judges appointed by him to preside over ordeals. However, the judges were no longer recruited from the clergy but from a group of professionals known as 'sergeants at law', who were probably the first known lawyers. Over time the number of the 'presenting jury' expanded to 48, and its mission began to include the determination of criminal responsibility. 22 The jury's decision was based on its members' personal knowledge of the case, as residents of the area in which the crime was committed. 23 Therefore, even at this stage in its development, the criminal trial was not seen as an arena for the collection and analysis of evidence (Wigmore, 1940: 235) , since all the relevant information was deemed to be in the personal possession of the decision-makers. 24 Instead, the trial's basic function was to serve as a public moral ritual. According to most historians, the jury continued to be self-informing until the beginning of the 16th century (Langbein, 1996 (Langbein, : 1170 , even though some mid-17th-century cases exist in which juries were instructed to rely on their own knowledge. 25 In 1352 the dual function of the jury was split (Devlin, 1956: 10) . A 'grand jury' or 'jury of indictment' was appointed to initiate criminal trials, whereas a separate 'petit jury' or 'jury of trial' was established to decide the cases (Cohen, 1992: 8) . Thus, the cornerstone was laid for a new criminal process, which distinguished between the two adversaries and the decision-maker. Separate procedures also began to emerge for serious crimes, soon to be termed felonies (Beattie, 1989: 17) .
The next important development took place at the beginning of the 16th century, when witnesses began to testify in court and the jury was finally regarded as a neutral and passive body. Legislation followed these new developments and in 1562, Parliament recognized the need to compel witnesses to come forward and deliver their testimony (Jackson, 1988: 488) . Until the early 17th century, only a prosecution was allowed to produce witnesses. This rule was changed in 1640, first in felony cases and then in all criminal proceedings (Williams, 1963: 6) . The 17th century was also the period in which the rule ensuring the jury's freedom to decide according to its conscience was fully recognized (Stephen, 1883: 304-6) . All these developments were part of the new criminal procedure that emerged at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century. The main characteristic of this new procedure was its scientific approach to factual inquiry, which manifested itself in the requirement that the jury should form its opinion solely upon the evidence submitted in court. 26
THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL FROM THE 16TH TO THE MID-18TH CENTURY
The criminal process at the beginning of the 18th century was not very different from its 16th-and 17th-century counterpart (Landsman, 1990: 506) . The hearing, which was relatively short, took place shortly after the alleged crime was committed and both parties appeared in court without counsel (Langbein, 1978b) . The prosecutors were usually the victims themselves. Less frequently and towards the end of this period, they were representatives of organizations that sought to eliminate certain types of crimes. 27 Defendants were not allowed to remain silent and judges actively encouraged them to plead not guilty. 28 Nearly all defendants took this advice and as a result, a detailed hearing into all the facts of the case, including the defendant's character and his reputation in society, almost always took place. A growing number of character witnesses gave testimony in court during this period, amounting to a third of the witnesses at the beginning of the 18th century. 29 The central figure in the courtroom was the judge, aided by the jury that formally decided the case (King, 2000: 223-4) . The judge and the jury actively interrogated the witnesses and at the end of the trial, the judge would give the jury detailed instructions, coupled with informal advice, which in the overwhelming majority of the cases was fully adopted by the jury. 30 None the less, the judges were careful not to overstate their role and repeatedly stressed the jury's independent status (Green, 1985: 369) . Judges were also charged with the duty to assist defendants during the course of the trial, but the assistance they granted was solely limited to legal matters. 31 Rules of evidence were not in existence during the 16th and 17th century (Baker, 1977: 39) , and therefore not only character evidence but also hearsay and evidence regarding the defendant's prior convictions were freely admitted (Langbein, 1978b: 301) .
Although a legal distinction did exist between the verdict and the judgment (known today as sentence), sentencing hearings had not yet developed. 32 Following conviction the defendant could request a retrial, a pardon or the benefit of clergy. 33 If this request was denied, the judge, or in some cases the recorder, would pass judgment. 34 The lack of a sentencing hearing fitted well with other characteristics of the criminal trial, mainly the wealth of evidence that came before the court in a 'unitary' hearing, including information that concerned both the offence and the character of the defendant (Green, 1985: 383) . Many historians go even further and claim that criminal trials looked very much like sentencing hearings (Langbein, 1983a: 41) , and most will agree that during this period, the criminal trial resembled current criminal procedure in the continental system (Langbein, 1978b: 315-16) .
Does the fact that sentencing hearings did not exist during this period, necessarily mean the absence of sentencing discretion? I suggest that it does not, and that the abundance of character evidence submitted to the courts hints that more was at stake than initially meets the eye. 35 As mentioned earlier, sentencing discretion had always been around in trials for misdemeanours (Hostettler, 1992: 128) . However, during the 17th and 18th centuries, sentencing discretion also existed in the punishment of felonies, a phenomenon not fully acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court and the legal literature. A possible explanation for this oversight is that the discretion took on unfamiliar forms and was practised implicitly rather than explicitly.
It is common knowledge that the formal sanction attached to most felonies was death, 36 often without any possibility to claim the benefit of clergy (Stephen, 1883: 469) . None the less, historians note that at the same time, the number of executions steadily decreased (Hay, 1975: 23) . The reason for this discrepancy is that various informal ways were devised in order to avoid the death penalty, or, in different terms, to mitigate overly harsh sentencing. The first informal method frequently employed was to convict the defendant of a non-capital offence rather than the offence with which he or she was charged. 37 This practice was known as 'pious perjury' (Blackstone, 1769: 239) , 'partial verdict' or 'undervaluing', 38 and was considered a central feature of the 18th-century criminal process (Beattie, 1986: 424) . A study of Old Bailey cases from the middle of the 18th century demonstrates that this practice was applied in approximately 25 per cent of the cases (Langbein, 1994 (Langbein, : 1063 . The decisions of the jury, heavily influenced by the judge, relied upon the seriousness of the offence, the conduct of the accused and the character evidence given in court (Langbein, 2003: 59) . Thus, the trial served a dual purpose, determining both responsibility and punishment. 39 A second method by which the death penalty was avoided was by way of pardon, which operated in a very different manner than today. 40 Only 20 per cent of those convicted of capital offences during the 18th century were actually executed (Fifoot, 1932: 116) , the main reason being the enormous number of convicts who received a pardon. 41 Usually it was the judges, and only rarely the convict or his family, who filed requests for pardon. 42 Upon receiving a request for pardon, the King always sought the judge's recommendation, and in most cases, the recommendation determined the fate of the request (King, 2000: 297) . The legal result of accepting the request was either complete release or exile to the colonies for a specified period of years. 43 The influence of judges on the pardon system was so great that:
In 1728 the judges were told to send in their lists of prisoners to be pardoned, with those they want transported, distinguished from those who deserved to be pardoned absolutely, an instruction that makes it clear that they were not required to justify these decisions, or to send in explanations and that their reprieve was almost certain to result in a pardon. (Beattie, 1986: 432, emphasis added) The recommendations of the judges were clearly based upon the evidence they heard during the trial (Langbein, 2003: 61) , even though additional information was occasionally brought to their attention by the convict or his family (Beattie, 1986: 446) . One of the reasons judges took notes during the trial, was to record the information that might later assist them in drafting a recommendation (Langbein, 1983a: 19-21) . Moreover, one of the main explanations for the judges' practice of discouraging defendants from pleading guilty was their desire to receive information necessary for the consideration of a pardon (Langbein, 1994 (Langbein, : 1064 . Historians conclude that the relatively few cases, in which convicts were not pardoned, can be explained by the nature of the crime, the number and content of the character testimonies and the social position and respect which the convict held within the community to which he or she belonged (Taylor, 1998: 129) . Moreover, analysis of pardon recommendations demonstrates that the criteria judges most frequently referred to, were those relating to the good character of the convict and his previous conduct. 44 The pardon process therefore played a central role in the sentencing system and unsurprisingly, it began to lose its importance once explicit sentencing discretion was bestowed upon judges in the early 19th century. 45 Sentencing discretion was also applied through the benefit of clergy, 46 and, in rare instances, on the basis of statutes that granted judges a certain amount of discretion in sentencing certain types of offences (Holdsworth, 1938: 556) . It is important to note at this juncture the important innovation of the Transportation Act 1718. The Act authorized judges to sentence convicts who successfully claimed the benefit of clergy, to a maximum period of seven years of exile, and to recommend an extended period of exile as a condition of pardoning convicts sentenced to death (Stephen, 1883: 471) . As a result of this legislation the number of pardons increased and the legislature refrained from further limiting the benefit of clergy. It is commonly claimed that allowing judges to exile convicts was one of the main reasons for the decrease in executions (Briggs et al., 1996: 81) .
In light of the various forms of sentencing discretion that existed during the 17th and 18th centuries, some historians argue that 19th-century legislation, which supposedly equipped judges with greater sentencing discretion, not only failed to increase the scope of their discretion, but actually restricted it (Hay, 1984: 11) . It is important to note that the argument refers to judges because their role was far more central in this respect, even though they 'shared powers of mitigation' with the jury, as often stated in the literature (Green, 1985: 284; Taylor, 1998: 112-13) .
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTENCING HEARINGS AT THE END OF THE 18TH CENTURY
Most historians claim that the modern adversarial system was formed in England during the second half of the 18th century (Landsman, 1990: 503; Langbein, 1996 Langbein, : 1196 Smith, 1998: 42-3) . The most convincing explanation for this development is the growing involvement of lawyers in criminal litigation during this period. 47 The rise in legal representation began gradually but developed steadily, and by the end of the 18th century most prosecutors and many (though fewer) defendants were assisted by counsel (Taylor, 1998: 114) . The immediate cause for the increase in representation was a series of amendments to existing legislation, which prohibited representation for criminal defendants. The first amendment was approved in parliament in 1695, 48 and the reform was completed in 1836. 49 Representation was apparently allowed earlier for defendants accused of misdemeanours (Beattie, 1991: 223) , and the prohibition ceased to be enforced in felony trials during the years 1720-30. 50 There is evidence that already in 1734-5, defence attorneys examined witnesses in court, 51 although only in 1760 were they formally allowed to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution (Williams, 1963: 7) . In any case it is clear that in the 1880s, the number of defence attorneys was significant and their impact on procedural matters was immense (Langbein, 1994 (Langbein, : 1047 .
The involvement of lawyers in the criminal trial brought about noticeable structural changes in the process. During the second half of the 18th century, each party was required to produce the bulk of his or her evidence in turn (Langbein, 1987: 29) . The art of cross-examination developed, and the trial began to focus more closely on the facts of the case and the weight of the evidence submitted by the parties (Beattie, 1991: 234) . Another major development was the emergence of the modern law of evidence (Taylor, 1998: 115-16; King, 2000: 225) . Some controversy exists as to the source of this development. Thayer (1898: 180) , supported by Holdsworth (1926: 127) , and Wigmore (1940: 27-32) , regards the law of evidence as the immediate 'child' of the jury system, i.e. the legal result of having laymen as the decision-makers of the trial. Morgan (1937 Morgan ( , 1956 , and others (Nance, 1988: 229-30) , hotly contest HOROVITZ The emergence of sentencing hearings Thayer's views and argue that the rules are the direct outcome of the lawyers' involvement in the trial and the rise of the modern adversarial system (Damaska, 1997: 2) . Morgan is willing to accept the proposition that the jury played some part in preserving certain evidentiary rules, but he rejects the claim that the English system was willing to rely on juries until the 18th century, and then, all of a sudden, lost its confidence in them. 52 A third theory, closer to that of Morgan, was advanced by Langbein. According to this theory, up until the 18th century judges kept juries in check by examining witnesses and issuing formal and informal instructions. Once lawyers became involved in the procedure, the collaboration between the judge and the jury collapsed, and the jury was left with little guidance or control. Langbein suggests that the purpose of the newly created exclusionary rules was to fill this void and install some form of control over the jury's discretion. 53 It is possible, perhaps, to settle this controversy by attributing different rules to different factors. It is clear, however, that the most dramatic change during the 18th century was the growing involvement of lawyers, and therefore the more plausible theories are seemingly those of Morgan and Langbein.
Damaska, who argued that breaking up the historical partnership between judge and jury in the middle of the 18th century did not affect jury control but issues of legitimacy, provides yet another theory for the emergence of the law of evidence. Damaska argues that as long as judges were actively involved in the process, the jury's unreasoned decisions received a certain measure of validation and scrutiny. However, once the judge's involvement in the process became subject to increasing restrictions, the only way to maintain the trial's legitimacy, was to give the parties complete control over the proceedings and the production of evidence. 54 In any case, the end result of this process was the articulation of the presumption of innocence during the second half of the 18th century (Beattie, 1986: 341) ; the development of the standard of proof in criminal proceedings 55 and its formulation in scientific terms of probability (Shapiro, 1986: 162-75 ) rather than certainty; 56 a growing disdain for the use of hearsay in courts; 57 the appearance of admissibility rules regarding confessions (Beattie, 1991: 232-3) ; rules requiring corroboration for the testimony of Kings' witnesses; 58 and the crystallization of the accused's right to silence (who by the means of representation could remain silent yet still have his counsel argue on his or her behalf ). 59 During this period the evidentiary rule prohibiting the prosecution from proving the defendant's past conduct also began to emerge, albeit in a rather haphazard fashion.
As a result of these multiple developments, which brought about drastic changes in the English common law, courts began to receive only relevant and admissible evidence and less and less information was presented within criminal proceedings. 60 The number of 'partial verdicts', which had played an important role in the criminal administration of the previous century, gradually decreased (Langbein, 2003: 59-60) . The main reasons for this decline were the limited amount of information regarding the offender and his socio-economic circumstances that now came before the courts, 61 and a growing number of restrictions that were placed upon the jury as part of the modern adversarial reform.
Before I turn to present historical evidence for the emergence of sentencing hearings during the second half of the 18th century, several observations regarding the factors that influenced this development are in store. It is clear that as the jury's discretion was curbed, the pressure on judges to mitigate punishment grew. However, the growing limitations on the nature of evidence parties were allowed to produce, not only affected the jury's ability to issue a 'partial verdict'. They also placed judges in an impossible situation, disabling them from making informed penal decisions.
Another important factor that influenced the emergence of sentencing hearings was a spreading perception during the late 18th century that the severity of the penalty should reflect the seriousness of the offence. Proportionality was an idea that was foreign to the formal criminal law of the late 17th and early 18th century (though not entirely to the practice of the criminal law during this period, as demonstrated earlier). The prescribed punishment for most felonies was death, while remaining felonies were sanctioned by an assortment of punishments, originating in different historical periods. The main justification for punishment was probably deterrence, in its most simplistic sense, devoid of any moral constraints (Holdsworth, 1938: 556-7, 561) . Pleas for penal reform began to increase in the mid-18th century and they received a major boost with the publication of Cesare Beccaria's seminal essay in 1764. An essay on crime and punishment, in which Beccaria developed the principles of legality, equality and proportionality in punishment (Merryman, 1985: 126) , had an enormous impact on both European thinkers (Foucault, 1979) and English jurisprudence. 62 Under the influence of Beccaria, who harshly criticized the death penalty and the pardon system (Sebba, 1977: 225) , public disapproval of the existing forms of punishment in England increased (Green, 1985: 289) , and the demand that courts mete out proportionate punishments became urgent (Chitty, 1816: 713) . There can be no doubt that public opinion, together with the limited explicit ability of the court to influence sentencing, led to significant changes in penal sanctioning during the second half of the 18th century (Holdsworth, 1938: 562) . These changes are reflected, for example, in the fact that by the 1790s, incarceration became the most common punishment for property offences that were not of extraordinarily severity. 63 A third factor that influenced the emergence of sentencing hearings was the continuing limitation of judicial authority under the new adversarial system. Judges, who had long been the centrepiece of the criminal trial, found themselves ousted by the lawyers from their role as managers of the courtroom (Landsman, 1990: 604) . Under these circumstances, it was only natural for judges to try and create a new sphere, in which their authority would be unrestricted.
These were the major factors that brought about sentencing hearings during the second half of the 18th century, first in trials for misdemeanours and then in trials for felonies. The reason for this sequence was the greater discretion afforded to judges in sentencing misdemeanours than in sentencing felonies, and the earlier representation of defendants in trials for misdemeanours. 64
EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SENTENCING HEARINGS IN THE LATE 18TH CENTURY
In 1768, when William Blackstone published the fourth volume of his Commentaries on the laws of England, dedicated to the exploration of 'Public Wrongs', no reference was made to sentencing hearings. All that Blackstone describes in this volume is a technical hearing, held before the judgment was issued, in which the convict was asked HOROVITZ The emergence of sentencing hearings whether or not he has a legal claim regarding the court's authority to impose punishment (Blackstone, 1769: 368-9) . Defendants were allowed to use the opportunity afforded to them to present arguments for order of a mistrial and rehearing of the case, to request a reprieve from punishment or to claim benefit of clergy. Blackstone does not mention procedural issues; however some historians claim that the convict was occasionally allowed to produce mitigating evidence in support of his request for reprieve (Durston, 2004: 627) . Less than 50 years later, Chitty published his descriptive book on the English criminal law, which includes a separate chapter titled 'Of proceedings between verdict and judgment' (Chitty, 1816: 651-94 (chapter XV) ). The chapter begins with a description of the same claims Blackstone refers to in his Commentaries, but continues to describe detailed procedures, aimed at verifying the facts that give rise to these claims. Chitty writes that a convict who requests a retrial must attach to his request an affidavit that sets out the facts relevant to the request (Chitty, 1816: 659) . In cases where a controversy arises regarding the felon's eligibility to claim benefit of clergy, Chitty reports that a special jury is empanelled which decides the issue after hearing witnesses. 65 However, the most dramatic procedural development described by Chitty is the emergence of sentencing hearings in misdemeanour trials:
When the defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor in the King's Bench . . . And as the prosecutor is only permitted on the trial to produce such of his evidence as is sufficient to convict the defendant. Therefore upon this motion affidavits may be read in aggravation of the offence and on the defendant's part in mitigation, as the defendant may by affidavit lessen the degree of his guilt. Each party must, therefore, then come prepared with affidavits disclosing all the circumstances of the case, taking care however not to attempt to dispute the propriety of the verdict. (Chitty, 1816: 691, emphases added) It is clear from this quotation that at the beginning of the 19th century, at least some courts held sentencing hearings in order to determine facts relevant for sentencing. The procedure which governed these sentencing hearings did not resemble the procedure which governed the first part of the trial, the main difference being that evidence was submitted to the court by affidavits and not orally. 66 After the affidavits were filed, an oral hearing took place, attended by both the defendant and the prosecution. Another point worth stressing is that unlike current practices in AngloAmerican legal systems, the court gave parties an extended opportunity to argue their case, 67 and it took its time in deliberating over the sentencing issues and deciding upon the punishment. 68 As Chitty cites decisions dating from the 1780s and 1790s, in which the court clarified various sentencing procedures, it seems clear that these hearings were not an invention of the early 19th century. Some of the cited cases refer to the order by which the affidavits should be read and the parties should sum up their arguments. 69 Others deal with the type of facts that can be included in the affidavits and restrict their possible impact on the punishment, 70 and also make reference to the right of the convict to respond to arguments made during the hearing. 71 Moreover a Practice Directive was issued in 1788 by the Court of King's Bench, which apparently applies to all criminal trials commenced by 'indictment or information '. 72 This directive states:
It is ordered that when any defendant shall be brought up for sentence on any indictment or information after verdict, the affidavits produced on part of the defendant, if any such are produced, shall be first read, and any affidavits produced on the part of the prosecution, shall be read, after which counsel for the defendant shall be heard, and lastly the counsel for the prosecution . . . (emphasis added) Consequently, there can be no doubt that sentencing hearings began to emerge at the end of the 18th century. These early hearings were subject to a unique set of procedural rules that compromised the oral nature of the proceedings. However, it is interesting to note that basic safeguards were installed and carefully maintained by the courts. The affidavits could not be based on hearsay; each party was given the opportunity to respond to factual claims made by the other party; prior misdeeds of the accused could be taken into account, but the court was not allowed to 'inflict a greater punishment than the principal punishment shall warrant'; 73 and the court deliberated over its decision for several days. More importantly, in cases of controversy, a jury decided the fact that could most drastically affect the defendant's punishment; namely the defendant's right to claim benefit of clergy.
SENTENCING PROCEDURE FROM THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE MID-20TH CENTURY
The procedural gap between what became the two stages of the criminal trial undoubtedly increased over the years. While it is difficult to account for the initial differences between the two stages, clear historical explanations exist for the tremendous changes that took place in sentencing procedure during the late 19th and early 20th century.
The end of the 19th century was a time of immense political and philosophical transformation. The welfare state developed, modernism flourished and new scientific fields emerged, including sociology, psychology, psychiatry and, somewhat later, criminology (Walker, 1998: 124) . Innovative research on criminality was published in which crime was presented as an outcome of physiological factors or other circumstances, 74 and later research linked criminal behaviour to individual pathology or maladjustment. Once criminality 'passed into the worlds of social science and social policy' (Norrie, 1998: 374) , it became clear that the only way to go about crime prevention was to solve the sociopsychological problems crime reflected (Tonry, 1982: 610-11) . Thus rehabilitation emerged as the main justification for punishment, and dominated theoretical and scholarly inquiry for over half a century. 75 According to the treatment model embraced by rehabilitation ideology, judges were called upon to diagnose defendants and assess their personalities, rather than pass judgment upon the criminal acts that they committed. Judges were now required to select appropriate punishments that would rehabilitate offenders, following consultation with the relevant experts. As the generally accepted assumption was that sentencing judges were functioning in a semi-scientific capacity, it is clear that as any other self-respecting expert, they required the utmost information about defendants, from any possible source. 76 As a result, sentencing hearings were stripped of procedural regulations and evidentiary obstacles, and judges were authorized to conduct unhindered inquiries into the offender's psyche and circumstances.
HOROVITZ The emergence of sentencing hearings
Very little discussion took place during this period regarding the procedural protections afforded to defendants at sentencing, even as procedural protections for criminal defendants steadily increased (Young, 1994: 308) . Sentencing hearings were transformed into such distinct entities during the first part of the 20th century that it comes as no surprise that many scholars assumed that sentencing hearings first appeared this period.
The treatment model had an enormous impact on legislation in the early 20th century, both in the United States (Dershowitz, 1976: 93-8) , and to a slightly lesser extent, in England (Shapland, 1981: 20; Hostettler, 1992) . Many innovations came about in its wake, including the indeterminate sentence (Friedman, 1993: 161) , parole (Walker, 1998: 100-3) , probation (Friedman, 1993: 162-3; Briggs, 1996: 239-40 ) and pre-sentence reports (Fennell and Hall, 1980: 1623; Ashworth, 2000: 312-15) .
The tides changed in the second half of the 20th century, following the atrocities of the Second World War. The optimism that marked the beginning of the 20th century began to disappear (Allen, 1998) , and doubts regarding the notion of rehabilitation and its side-effects (Tonry, 1982: 615-16; Walker, 1998: 207-8) , including persistent inequality in punishment, started to emerge (American Friends Service Committee, 1971) . Over the past 50 years, the treatment model has been replaced with a new concept of 'just deserts', reflecting the older principle of proportionality (von Hirsch, 1976) . Once this transition was completed and judges in the pursuit of 'just deserts' began to look at the particulars of the offence and the harm it caused, sentencing procedure finally came under scrutiny by defendants and their attorneys.
Two additional factors must be mentioned in this context. The first is the rise of sentencing guidelines, which spelled out to those who still needed convincing that judges determine facts during sentencing hearings. As mentioned earlier, this is the main reason for the huge wave of litigation on sentencing procedure that currently preoccupies the United States Supreme Court, and many other courts throughout the United States.
The second factor that made problems inherent in sentencing procedure particularly acute, is the continuous increase in plea bargaining since the second half of the 19th century. 77 At the end of the 20th century, 91 per cent of criminal trials in the United States (Bibas, 2001 (Bibas, : 1150 , and between 75 per cent (in Crown Court cases) to 94 per cent (in magistrate's courts) of criminal trials in England (Ashworth, 2000: 24) , were resolved through guilty pleas. In these cases, judges are left with very little information regarding the circumstances of the offence and the blameworthiness of the offender at the beginning of the sentencing hearing. Thus sentencing hearings have become the first and only opportunity to investigate the details of the case.
CONCLUSION
During the second part of the 18th century, the importance of sentencing decisions, as an inseparable part of the criminal process, began to gain recognition. William Paley, a famous theologian who also served as a Justice of Peace, expressed this sentiment, in the following manner: 78 The questions, whether the prisoner be guilty? and whether being guilty he ought to be executed? are equally questions of public justice. The adjudication of the latter question is as PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 9(3) much a function of magistracy as the trial of the former. The public welfare is interested in both.
The essay attempted to demonstrate that the above recognition was not only theoretical, but also had practical manifestations. From the material presented in the essay, it is clear that sentencing hearings began to appear in English courtrooms no later than the late 18th century, in contradiction to different claims made in American case-law and legal literature.
Several additional conclusions can be drawn from the historical account provided. First, there is no doubt that sentencing discretion existed much before the 19th century. For many centuries English law drew a distinction between misdemeanours and felonies, 79 and the authorities are unanimous in stating that judges always had some measure of discretion in sentencing misdemeanors (Stephen, 1883: 88) . Sentencing felonies was a far more complex historical phenomenon. None the less, even in this respect some discretion existed, at least since the 18th century. 80 Thus, sentencing discretion seems to have been a component of the common law system for several hundred years.
Who was in charge of applying this discretion? Historically, judges nearly always had the major say in sentencing and therefore, at the end of the 18th century, they were the body entrusted with finding the relevant sentencing factors. 81 A possible explanation for entrusting judges, rather than juries, is that sentencing is a function that involves implementation of policy, rather than settling a dispute (Damaska, 1986) . Moreover, judges were the only check government had on criminal proceedings, as up until the end of the 19th century, prosecution was in private hands. 82 Therefore, the current division of labour between jury and judge, where juries find guilt and judges sentence convicts, is deeply rooted in the history of the common law trial. This indicates that the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, regarding the infringement of this division of labour, have a solid foundation in 18th century case-law. 83 Another conclusion is that with little exception, during most of the 18th century sentencing factors were established on the basis of the same single hearing that comprised the entire criminal trial. 84 Not only the jury but also the judge based their respective decisions on the evidence submitted in court, and therefore, aside from the identity of the decision-maker, no procedural difference existed between the way elements of the offence and sentencing factors were established in court.
Why then, once separate sentencing hearings emerged, were sentencing hearings based on affidavits rather than oral testimonies? One explanation is that sentencing hearings replaced the pardon system, which allowed judges to mitigate punishment through recommendations made to the King. Since pardon proceedings were based on written material, it is plausible that sentencing hearings that replaced them, adopted at first a similar procedure. Another possibility is that up until the mid-19th century, factfinding in sentencing was restricted to relatively unimportant facts. 85 The reason for this is that prosecutors were not confined to stating the bare elements of the offence in the indictment, as later became the case (see King and Klein, 2001 : 1499 footnote 113). Therefore, very few significant facts were established at the sentencing stage, which was merely regarded as a supplement to the main proceeding. 86 On the other hand, when extremely significant sentencing facts were in controversy, such as the benefit of clergy, HOROVITZ The emergence of sentencing hearings a jury was empanelled. The differential procedural treatment that prevailed at the end of the 18th century suggests that perhaps not all sentencing facts should procedurally be treated in the same fashion, an idea which has been discussed in the legal literature (Lynch, 1998) .
During the period in which the treatment model was embraced by legislatures and courts alike, from the end of the 19th century and until the middle of the 20th century, sentencing hearings acquired most of their flexible and informal attributes. As rehabilitation fell out of favour as the main goal of punishment during the second part of the 20th century, the current justification for many of these attributes is unclear. Therefore, sentencing procedure must be thoroughly re-evaluated in light of the presently accepted justifications for punishment. 87 Finally, the main characteristic of criminal trials in current times is plea bargaining, which transformed sentencing hearings into the sole interaction most offenders have with the court-room and all it has come to symbolize. If criminal procedure is deemed to fulfil any expressive functions (Goodpastor, 1987: 149) , or social tasks (Nesson, 1985) , the only practical chance to advance these goals is during the sentencing phase. Moreover, in our present world of plea-bargains, fact-finding has become an inseparable and increasingly important component of sentencing hearings. Therefore, the current absence of distinct fact-finding procedures in sentencing hearings must urgently be addressed.
The immediate aim of the essay was to fill a void in the literature regarding the emergence of sentencing hearings. This topic is not only interesting from an historical point of view. As I attempted to show in this concluding section, its exploration can also equip us with insights that enrich the discussion regarding the neglected and complicated problem of sentencing procedure. 88 1 This is not the case in continental legal systems, in which criminal trials are unitary and judges decide simultaneously upon guilt and (when necessary) punishment (Damaska, 1994: 55, 56 ). 2 In some common-law jurisdictions, such as Israel, judges preside over criminal trials.
More importantly, in many common-law jurisdictions that have juries, the vast majority of criminal cases are concluded without them (Bibas, 2001 (Bibas, : 1150 . For a general survey, see Jackson and Doran (1997: 646) . 3 While this is the norm in common-law jurisdictions, in several states in the United States, juries also have a role in sentencing. See, for example, Lanni (1999) . Juries also decide upon the death penalty in most of the states that allow for capital punishment (White, 1991: 73) . 4 Thus, for example, an indictment sheet informing the defendant of the particulars of the accusation and the witnesses for the prosecution must be filed at the opening of the trial. Upon the commencement of a sentencing hearing, however, the prosecution is not under any such duty. 5 One possible reason is that criminal reporting is a 19th-century tradition whereas sentencing hearings emerged earlier, as I will later demonstrate (Langbein, 1983a: 2-3) . Moreover, only a modest body of writing exists regarding the rise of the modern criminal trial (Green, 1985: 366) . 6 Sentencing guidelines created a great surge of litigation in courts, because they highlighted the lack of procedural safeguards in sentencing hearings and the previously unnoticed fact-finding role of judges during this stage of the criminal trial. 7 See US Const. art III, § 2, clause 3. The court held that the States were bound by this provision in Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) , which based its decision upon the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 For a discussion of the role of the Framer's intent in United States constitutional debate and interpretation, see, for example, Fallon (1987) . Other implicit reasons for judges' inclination to engage in an historical inquiry include various concerns that underlie judicial decisions such as legitimization, continuity and stability (Murphy et al., 2001: 390) . 9 See, for example, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 478-81, 525-8 (2000) ; Blakely v. Washington, 301-2, 323, 342-4 (2004) . 10 See, for example, Note (1968: 821-2); Herman (1992) . An exception to this tendency is Lillquist (2004) , which paid much greater attention to the history of sentencing hearing. However, the main focus of Lillquist's article is the identity of the decision maker in sentencing hearings, and not the development of the dual structure of the criminal trial and the procedural regime of the sentencing hearing. 11 See, for example, Herman (1992: 302-3 , emphases added):
Historically, sentencing developed as a truly distinct procedural phase only with the advent of the offender oriented indeterminate sentence. At early common law, both in England and in the Colonies sentences were usually mandatory. The facts on which sentencing was based were decided by the jury, so there was little need for a separate proceeding. Sentencing was merely a ministerial act. As the use of the quantifiable sanction of incarceration grew, and as rehabilitation became a goal of sentencing, the need for discretion in sentencing increased . . . Therefore, most jurisdictions assumed that a separate sentencing proceeding was needed, to develop whatever offender oriented facts the sentencing judge might consider relevant.
12 For a broader and informed discussion, see Bartlett (1986) . 13 Battle was a Norman innovation which was first installed in England after the invasion of William the Conqueror and mainly served to settle private criminal claims and land disputes. Battles were no longer held after 1485, though they were formally abolished only in 1818 (Baker, 1990: 87; Briggs et al., 1996: 6-7 ). 14 Compurgation, also known as 'wager of law' or 'canonical purgation', was more common in civil litigation and only rarely applied in criminal proceedings.
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According to this method, the accused had to swear his innocence on the Bible and produce several other people who were willing to swear to his honesty. Compurgation was formally abolished in 1833, but since the 16th century it was no longer employed. 15 See Frank (1949: 42-44 
The ordeals, then, represent one aspect of a magico-religious attitude . . . Magic, then, appears to be primitive man's way of dealing with specific practical problems when he is in peril or in need, and his strong desires are thwarted because his rational techniques, based upon observation prove ineffective.
16 See, for example, Cohen (1992: 5-7) ; McAuley (2006) . Not all scholars, however, agree with this theory (Bartlett, 1986; Palmer, 1989) . 17 Much has been written on the Renaissance but the classic text still remains Burckhardt (1860) . 18 For a discussion of this system and its later influences, see, for example, Langbein (1978a) . 19 For a learned study of the historical development of the jury, see Devlin (1956) . 20 Section 39, drafted in 1215, states:
No freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed, or exiled or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. (emphasis added) 21 See Baker (1990: 579-80) . This practice became mandatory after the Assize of Clarendon of 1166 came into force. 22 As put by Lord Devlin: 'It was King Henry II who was directly responsible for turning the jury into an instrument for doing justice, and Pope Innocent III who was indirectly responsible for its development as a peculiarly English institution ' (1956: 7) . 23 Stephen (1883: 304-6) claims that the independence of the later jury, as reflected in the Bushell case decided in 1670, can be attributed to the early 'self-informing' jury described here. 24 The jury functioned in fact as 'active neighborhood investigators' (Langbein, 1973) . 25 See, for example, Pike (1876: 20): It was held by one judge, as late as 1670, that they (the jury) must give a verdict 'even though no evidence was given on either side in court' and that for this purpose they were chosen from the neighborhood in which a dispute had arisen or a crime had been perpetrated.
27 See Taylor (1998: 110): Depending for their resources upon membership subscriptions, such organizations -some 450 were scattered unevenly across England and Wales in the years between 1744 and 1856 -offered rewards for evidence leading to successful prosecution and expenses to cover the costs of prosecution.
28 Not all evidence scholars agree on that the right of silence developed during this period. Wigmore (1940: 236) , for example, claimed that it was recognized earlier, after the demise of the Star Chamber during the first half of the 17th century. On the other hand, Langbein (1994) argues forcefully that the right only developed during the second part of the 18th century. 29 According to a sample of cases compiled by Malcolm Feeley, character witnesses accounted for 30-35 per cent of all witnesses at the beginning of the 18th century.
Other research supports this finding (Langbein, 1994: 304; Feeley, 1997) . 30 For a description of the extensive co-operation between judges and jury during this period, see Beattie (1986: 410) . For an assessment of the judges' control over juries, see Langbein (1983a: 119) . 31 See, for example, Taylor (1998: 114) ; Beattie (1991: 223) :
It was often said that to the extent that the defendant required counsel, the English judges took that role upon themselves. But what was meant was that the judges would protect defendants against illegal procedure, faulty indictments and the like. It did not mean that judges would help the accused to formulate a defense or act as their advocates.
32 The significance of this distinction was that the convict's civil rights were only forfeited after judgment (Blackstone, 1769: 374) . 33 The history of the 'benefit of clergy' is fascinating and demonstrates how rights are remoulded over time, according to changes in social institutions and political ideologies. Originally, the benefit of clergy was only extended to clergymen, and granted them immunity in civil courts (thus the original term: 'privilegium clericale'). A hundred years later, the benefit no longer granted immunity from civil or criminal trials, but only from criminal punishment. In 1350 the benefit was bestowed upon all literate defendants charged with felony, and in 1487 legislation was passed that allowed defendants to claim the 'benefit of clergy' only once (notwithstanding clergymen who could claim the benefit without limitation). After a series of additional modifications to the scope of the benefit, it was finally granted to the population at large, and in 1705 judges were given the authority to sentence convicts claiming the benefit to a maximum of one-year imprisonment, together with the branding of the hand. At about the same time the legislator began to disallow claiming of the benefit with respect to a growing number of offences. During the 18th century, judges were authorized to send convicts who successfully claimed the benefit to seven years' exile in the colonies. Blackstone sums up these developments in a characteristic manner:
In this state does the benefit of the clergy stand; very considerably different from its original institution; the wisdom of the English legislature having in the course of a long and laborious process, extracted by a noble alchemy rich medicines out of poisonous HOROVITZ The emergence of sentencing hearings ingredients and converted by gradual mutations what was at first an unreasonable exemption of particular popish ecclesiastics, into a merciful mitigation of the general law with respect to capital punishment. (1769: 364) 34 In 1750 the following custom was prevalent in the Old Bailey, which demonstrates the technicality of the judgment:
The clerks kept the official records of verdicts and at the Old Bailey the Recorder of London passed sentence at the end of the sessions on the convicts, even those tried before other judges, except for murder where sentence was passed immediately upon the return of verdict. (Langbein, 1983a: 12, 46, emphasis added) 35 Lacey (2001: 256-61) claims that criminal responsibility during this period was based on 'character' rather than 'capacity', and that character evidence served to establish criminal responsibility. However, Lacey herself acknowledges the dual function of the proceeding at the time, and admits that much of the character evidence was submitted to the court in order to support lenient or severe punishment (Feeley, 1997: 183) . Moreover, Archbold states in a treatise published in 1822 but based on much earlier cases, that character evidence may have an impact on the question of guilt 'only in doubtful cases: where the probabilities of the defendant's guilt on the one side and the probabilities of his innocence on the other side are nearly equal' (1822: 70, emphasis added). 36 In 1769, Blackstone counted 160 felonies punished by death, which led him to voice a harsh and extremely rare criticism of the English legal system (Blackstone, 1769: 18) . Others put the number of capital felonies during this period at 200 (Radinowicz and Hood, 1986: 724) . 37 Langbein (1983b: 109) . It was also possible, of course, to acquit the defendant, which occurred during this period at an uncanny rate (50 per cent of the cases) and often as a result of various judicial manipulations (Hay, 1984: 4-5; Green, 1985: 274-6) . As my discussion focuses on sentencing discretion, I will not elaborate upon this interesting phenomenon. 38 'Undervaluing' -because property crime was punished by death, only if the value of the property was above a certain sum. The jury therefore undervalued the property in cases when it did not want to see the defendant executed (Green, 1987: 44) . 39 Some claim that for this reason, substantive English criminal law did not develop for many years (Smith, 1998: 45) . For a more general account of the trial's dual function, see Holdsworth (1938: 560) ; Green (1985: 281) ; Beattie (1986: 429) . 40 The main difference is that in the past, pardon was the only direct way to overcome statutory punishment, whereas today it is the daily job of judges (Sebba, 1977: 230) . 41 According to Blackstone, half of those convicted of capital offences were pardoned on the basis of the judge's recommendation to the King (Blackstone, 1769: 19; Hay, 1975: 43) . In some districts and during certain periods, the rate of pardons was even higher (Gatrell, 1994: 200-2; Taylor, 1998: 119-20) . 42 The judges submitted requests for pardon not only to mitigate the punishment, but also when they thought the jury made a legal error. Thus the pardon procedure also served as an informal system of appeal (Baker, 1990: 590) .
43 The pardon system therefore paved the way to the adoption of a new form of punishment -exile, in the following manner:
Prior to 1717, when legislation empowered the courts to impose this penalty directly, the same objective was achieved by granting a conditional pardon to a felon who had been sentenced to death, the condition being that he agreed to be transported. (Sebba, 1977: 224) 44 See Macnally (1802: 323):
There is a sound and humane reason for admitting such evidence [character evidence -AH]. The king is sworn at his coronation to administer justice in mercy; and therefore judges, who represent majesty, sitting in the judgment seat, are called upon to receive such evidence, to ground and support a recommendation to royal clemency in such cases where the evidence warrants it.
See also King: 'Most sentencing and pardoning decisions were almost certainly based on universal and widely agreed criteria ' (1984: 44, 58) . 45 See Langbein (1983b: 109, emphasis added); Baker (1990: 590) :
The pardon process is best understood as an adjunct to the sentencing system, compensating for the lack of direct judicial discretion. The secretaries of state and monarch regularly deferred to judges on pardon matters.
46 For an explanation of this term, see note 33. Chitty explains the effect of the benefit of clergy on sentencing discretion, in the following manner:
we now consider benefit of clergy, or rather the benefit of the statutes, as a relaxation of the rigor of the law . . . exempting offending individuals in some cases from the punishment of death and subjecting them to milder punishment; and therefore in the case of clergyable felonies we now profess to measure the degree of punishment by the real enormity of the offence. (1816: 674) It is important to note that in some cases, justices also had some power to ignore a previous claim of the benefit (Beattie, 1986: 452-3) . 47 See Feeley (1997); Langbein (1978b: 306) :
The formation of the law of evidence, from the middle of the eighteenth century, is more or less contemporaneous with the onset of the lawyerization of the criminal trial. My suggestion therefore is that the true historical function of the law of evidence may not have been so much jury control as lawyer control.
Other less convincing theories include a growing fear of wrongful convictions based on evidence provided by professional thief catchers and an increase in litigation aimed at bringing about social change. Both theories are advanced in Landsman (1990: 577-9, 589) . 48 For the first time in English History, the Treason Act of 1696 allowed defendants indicted for treason to retain counsel, for the first time in English history (for a brief description of the many innovations brought about by this Act, see Jenks, 1928: 344-5) . It seems that the relevant clauses in the Act were drafted, because of the rareness of treason cases and the fact that the prosecution was usually HOROVITZ The emergence of sentencing hearings
represented. Therefore, a sense of fairness apparently compelled the legislator to allow representation for the defendant as well. 49 The reform was completed with the legislation of the Prisoner's Counsel Act, 1836, which allowed all defendants in criminal proceedings to be represented. The Act provided that defence attorneys could not only examine witnesses but also sum cases before the jury, equalizing their rights to those of prosecutors (Cairns, 1998: 177) . 50 It is unclear what exactly happened during those years. Beattie's (1991: 224) theory is that judges allowed defendants to be represented, because many prosecutors retained counsel. 51 Langbein (1978b: 307-8 52 See Morgan (1956: 117) : 'it may be fairly said that while distrust of the jury had nothing to do with the origin of the hearsay rule, it has exerted a strong influence in preventing or delaying its liberalization'. 53 Langbein (1996 Langbein ( : 1196 , emphases added):
[F]rom the mid-eighteenth century . . . to the mid-nineteenth century when the modern law of evidence was unmistakably in place -the degree of judicial collaboration in the formulation of the jury's verdict declined materially . . . The modern law of evidence is part of a new and formal system of jury control that replaced the older informal system . . . Adversary procedure pressured the judge toward passivity and broke up the older working relationship of judge and jury . . . The informal system of jury control that we see in the Ryder sources was incompatible with the lawyer dominated trial that took hold a generation after Ryder. Evidentiary concerns such as hearsay, that had remained within judicial discretion when the judge still dominated the trial, were reformulated at the end of the eighteenth century and across the nineteenth century into rules of admissibility and exclusion.
54 See Damaska (1997: 44-6 , emphasis added):
There is a palliative for this predicament, however: What remains open to challenge is the suitability of the database supplied to the inscrutable decision-makers. If the rational support for the output of their decision-making process eludes supervision, the rational support for the input can be subject to attack . . . For it is mainly through their influence on what evidentiary material the procedural Sphinx hears and sees that the parties feel they can affect the outcome of the case . . . For the law is animated not only by the desire to prevent factual error but also by the desire to shore up ex ante the legitimacy of inscrutable jury verdicts. This desire may indeed be the single most neglected contribution of the jury to the rationale for evidentiary arrangements peculiar to the Anglo-American procedural tradition.
55 See Blackstone (1769: 352) : 'all presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously: for the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer'. However, McCormick claims that: 'The demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times but its crystallization into the formula "beyond reasonable doubt" seems to have occurred as late as 1798' (Strong, 1992: 577) . 56 The former formulation was that: 'jurors must act upon their own beliefs and that they must be fully satisfied that their beliefs were supported by the great weight of the testimony' (Green, 1985: 273) . 57 During the 1730s, the first rule belonging to this unique category of exclusionary rules emerged and by the end of the century: 'The rule became ever more formal and both counsel and the court were increasingly likely to insist on its enforcement' (Landsman, 1990: 572) . 58 Some claim that historically, this may have been the first rule of evidence to develop (Beattie, 1991: 232-3; Taylor, 1998: 115) . 59 See Langbein (1994 Langbein ( : 1048 Until the later eighteenth century, for almost all criminal defendants, defending meant responding to the details of accusation. Only with the ascendance of defense counsel did the 'testing the prosecution' trial develop, and only then did it become possible to speak of a privilege against self incrimination in common law criminal procedure.
60 It is interesting to note that the emergence of the law of evidence conflicted with Bentham's ideas that began to circulate at the end of the 18th century and had a significant influence on English legislation. For an exposition of the contradictory influences on English common law, on the one hand, and English legislation, on the other hand, see Allen (1997: 186) . 61 This is because much of the information necessary for sentencing was based on hearsay or unsupported gossip. Character evidence was still admissible for determining guilt at the beginning of the 19th century, but the evidence was subject to an increasing amount of limitations (Note, 1942: 717) . 62 Beccaria's book was translated to English in 1767 and left a great imprint on both Blackstone and Bentham (Smith, 1998) . However, Beccaria's notion that penalties should be specified by the legislator and not left to the discretion of judges was not adopted in the common law system (Stith and Cabranes, 1998: 13) . 63 See Beattie (1986: 601, 610, 613) ; Taylor (1998: 145) . Another reason for this development was also the decline of transportation at the end of the 18th century. 64 It is interesting to note, once again, the link between character evidence and judicial discretion in sentencing. As the earlier forms of judicial discretion were applied in felony cases and particularly, in capital cases for a much long period, an exception to the rule excluding character evidence was recognized in capital cases, already at the end of the 18th century (Macnally, 1802: 320) . 65 See Chitty (1816: 687-8 
On the benefit of the clergy being demanded by a common person, who can only once receive it, the crown may file a counter plea, stating that he has had it before . . . In this HOROVITZ The emergence of sentencing hearings he may reply . . . and deny that he is the person named in the plea of the prosecutor. Upon this issue will be joined and a jury returned instanter to try it, any of whom the prisoner may challenge. The jury is then to be sworn to try the identity in issue.
66 It is important to note that certain rules applied to the contents of the affidavits, for example: 'An affidavit of what third parties have said, who might have sworn themselves and that they refused so to do, cannot be admitted, unless it appears that they were under the influence or control of the defendant' (Chitty, 1816: 692) . 67 'Where the matter disclosed by the affidavits on either side is such as the other party could not be supposed to be prepared to answer; the court will allow time to frame a reply' (Chitty, 1816: 692, emphasis added) . 68 'The proceedings of this day being closed, the court in cases of misdemeanors usually takes some days to consider the punishment which under all the circumstances of the case shall be awarded' (Chitty, 1816: 693, emphasis added When the defendant is brought up for judgment, his acts subsequent to the trial may be considered either by way of mitigating or aggravating the punishment, even though they may be separate or different offences for which he may be afterwards punished. But in such cases the court will take care not to inflict a greater punishment that the principle punishment shall warrant. (emphasis added) 71 See R. v. Wilson and Others (1791) 487: 'if in the course of inquiry the court wish to have any point further explained, they will give the defendant an opportunity of answering it on a future day'. 72 The order was published in Mich. 29 Geo. III 1788 and appears in Gude (1828: 376) . 73 See R. v. Withers (1789) 428 (emphasis added). 74 The Italian researcher, Cesare Lombroso, one of the first writers in what became to be known as the 'positivist school' of criminology, published his famous essay: The delinquent man, in 1876. On positive theories in general, see Ferri (1971: 229) . 75 See Allen (1971: 319, emphases added): in no other period has the rehabilitative ideal so completely dominated theoretical and scholarly inquiry, to such an extent that in some quarters it is almost assumed that matters of treatment and reform of the offender are the only questions worthy of serious attention in the whole field of criminal justice and corrections.
76 See, for example, Justices Black's remarks in Williams v. New York (1949) : 'modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence'.
77 See Alschuler (1979: 5-6 , emphasis added); Fisher (2000) :
The judicial practice of discouraging guilty pleas persisted into the second half of the nineteenth century, but at about this time prosecutorial plea bargaining emerged . . . Despite general disapproval, plea bargaining became a dominant method of resolving criminal cases at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth.
78 Paley (1785: 305) . Strictly speaking, the quotation refers to the death penalty and pardons, but from the argument in its entirety, it is clear that Paley is discussing the general issue of sentencing. The view that judges should possess sentencing discretion, rather than have punishment determined by the legislature, was not shared by all legal scholars of the time (Romilly, 1810: 57) . Interestingly, Romilly's critique of Paley's views is very familiar to the claims made by proponents of sentencing guidelines. 79 The following passage provides a concise explanation of the difference between felonies and misdemeanours:
misdemeanors did not amount to felony and were generally punished by imprisonment or fine. Felonies were generally capital offences and were distinguished as crimes which occasioned at common law a total forfeiture of lands or goods or both . . . Significantly, this distinction affected legal procedures, including the right of an accused's counsel to address the jury . . . Furthermore, the two distinctions between indictable and summary offences, and felony and misdemeanor, did not necessarily coincide. While all felonies were indictable offences, some could be tried summarily and a number of misdemeanors, such as assaults, riots and obtaining goods by false pretences, were also indictable offences and tried on indictment. (Taylor, 1998: 10-11; Langbein, 1987: 13) 80 'Although . . . the death penalty was a leading feature of penal thinking and practice throughout the early modern period, the most striking feature about the pre-modern system of punishment was its complexity. Variety, not monotony, was its keynote' (Briggs et al., 1996: 73) . 81 There are some exceptions to this statement, including 'pious perjury', 'partial verdict' and 'undervaluing', described earlier in the essay. Other exceptions I didn't dwell upon, are the phenomena of jury sentencing in the United States, especially during the 19th century (Wright, 1999) ; and jury sentencing in capital trials, which prevails in many states that retained the death penalty (White, 1991) . 82 Smith (1998: 42-3) : 'At the beginning of the nineteenth century, around 80 per cent of prosecutions were brought by victims, with the bulk of the remaining cases initiated by parish constables'. 83 I am referring, of course to the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington (2004) , and United States v. Booker (2005) , in which the court held, respectively, that the Washington sentencing scheme and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate defendants' constitutional right to trial by jury, by authorizing judges to determine factors that should be found by juries. 84 The exception being the rare instances, mentioned earlier in the essay, when the convict or his family produced additional information in their request for pardon.
HOROVITZ The emergence of sentencing hearings 85 As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of defendants claimed innocence and therefore a full trial nearly always took place (Langbein, 1978b) . 86 See Chitty (1816: 693) : 'any matter which is the consequence of the crime may be stated in aggravation, as otherwise every prosecutor would be compelled by stating every fact to make his indictment as long as his evidence'. 87 See, for example, Pope (1986 Pope ( : 1275 ) (critically describing the current role of the pre-sentence report); Bunzel (1994) (critically examining the current role of the probation officer). 88 Mirjan Damaska puts it in a slightly different way:
in addressing the character of Anglo-American fact finding, two distinctive approaches are usually conflated and separate line of inquiry often confused. The first approach is historical: it tries to ascertain causative factors that brought about particular fact-finding doctrines and practices. The second line of inquiry is analytical and interpretive: it is concerned with the study of factors that provide fact-finding arrangements with a plausible justification. The two approaches are closely connected: a factor that provides a good justification for an evidentiary rule can -as part of the motivational syndrome for its acceptance -easily find a place in the casual story describing the rule 's origin. (1997: 3, emphases added) 
